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SPACE, TIME AND MOLYNEUXÕS QUESTION 
Louise Richardson 
 
Abstract 
Whatever the answer to MolyneuxÕs question is, it is certainly not 
obvious that the answer is ÔyesÕ. In contrast, it seems clear that we 
should answer affirmatively a temporal variation on MolyneuxÕs 
question, introduced by Gareth Evans. I offer a phenomenological 
explanation of this asymmetry in our responses to the two questions. 
This explanation appeals to the modality specific spatial structure of 
perceptual experience and its amodal temporal structure. On this 
explanation, there are differences in the perception of spatial properties 
in different modalities, but these differences do not stand in the way of 
the objectivity of perceptual experience.  
 
It has seemed obvious to many that perceptual experiences are transparent: when we 
turn our attention to them, it Ôpasses throughÕ to the mind-independent objects and 
properties that we perceive. But it is equally obvious that in so doing we find those 
objects and properties presented to us in certain ways: seeing a lemon and the shape of 
the lemon is phenomenally unlike perceiving those things by touch, for instance. 
Here, I explore one respect in which this is the case. Though it may be that the only 
things to which we can directly attend, in reflecting on our perceptual experiences, are 
the lemons, tables and suchlike that we perceive, in thus attending we become aware 
of the sense-specific structure or form of our perceptual experiences of those objects 
and their properties. Furthermore, I will argue that whilst the spatial structure of 
perceptual experience differs across the senses, its temporal structure does not. 
Perceptual experience is in this way spatially modality-specific, but temporally 
amodal.  
I will approach these issues via MolyneuxÕs Question, a temporal variation on that 
question and an interesting asymmetry in how one naturally responds to the two. This 
will help to make apparent the nature of the structural features of perceptual 
experience with which I am concerned. In particular, it will help me to argue that 
these features do not stand in the way of the objectivity of perceptual experienceÑits 
presenting us, as we think it does, with a world of mind-independent objects and their 
properties. In fact, as comparison between the temporal and spatial structure of 
perceptual experience helps to make clear, those modality-specific spatial aspects of 
perceptual experience may have a positive role to play in its objectivity.  
 
1. MolyneuxÕs question and the temporal variation 
In LockeÕs Essay, William MolyneuxÕs now-eponymous question appears thus: 
Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to 
distinguish between a cube and a sphereÉso as to tell, when he felt one and 
tÕother, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and 
sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see. Quaere, whether 
Penultimate version. For the final, published version, see: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/rati.12081/abstract
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by his sight, before he touchÕd them, he could now distinguish, and tell, 
which is the globe, which the cube?
1
  
This question has been subject to more than one variation. EvansÕ temporal variation 
asks: 
 
[W]hether a man born deaf, and taught to apply the terms ÔcontinuousÕ and 
ÔpulsatingÕ to stimulations made on his skin, would, on gaining his hearing 
and being presented with two tones, one continuous and the other pulsating, be 
able to apply the terms correctly.
2
  
 
This is a temporal variation on the question in that the qualities ÔpulsatingÕ and 
ÔcontinuousÕ are most naturally understood as temporal qualities. Something 
ÔpulsatingÕ, for instance occupies an interval of time in a way that involves regular, 
rhythmic, change. Something continuous, on the other hand, happens or exists without 
interruption. The original question, of course, asks about spatial rather than temporal 
qualities: particular ways of taking up or extending into space.  
 
2. Grush and the skills-based view 
Evans believes that Ôfew of us have a doubt about the outcomeÕ of the temporal 
variation on MolyneuxÕs question (or ÔTMQÕ).
3
 He is confident that the answer to 
TMQ is ÔyesÕ, and that we will share his confidence. If the newly-hearing man was 
unable to apply the terms ÔpulsatingÕ and ÔcontinuousÕ correctly, we would Ôfeel 
obliged to interpret this as casting doubt upon his understanding of the terms which 
we thought we had introduced to himÉÕ.
4
  Evans doesnÕt, however, say anything 
more about why he (and, he believes, we) would respond in this way. Rick Grush 
supplies an explanation on EvansÕ behalf. On GrushÕs view, Evans was formulating a 
theory of perceptual content based on the subjectÕs possession of skills: a theory of a 
kind that Grush himself endorses. In his paper on MolyneuxÕs question (or ÔMQÕ), 
unfinished and published posthumously, Evans went some way to defending such a 
theory of the perceptual representation of spatial properties, and would, Grush 
believes, have held an analogous view of the perceptual representation of temporal 
properties.
5
  
Evans presents (via an imaginary philosopher, V) a view of conscious perceptual 
experience of spatial properties according to which it is partly constituted, in both 
vision and touch, by the having of information specifiable by saying things like ÔupÕ 
and ÔforwardsÕ, where these direction-terms Ôderive their meaning from their 
(complicated) connections with the actions of the subject.Õ 
6
 In this way, there is a 
Ôcommon basis for the application ofÉspatial conceptsÕ in both vision and tactile 
perception.
7
 It is for this reason that the answer to MolyneuxÕs question is supposed, 
by V, to be ÔyesÕ. Grush argues that from these materials Ôa defense of EvansÕ 
conclusion concerning pulsatingness can be organized.Õ Experience represents 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Second edition) (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1694), II, IX. 
2
 Gareth Evans, ÔMolyneuxÕs questionÕ in J. McDowell (Ed.), Collected Papers: Gareth Evans 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) pp.344-399, at p.372. 
3
 Evans, ÔMolyneuxÕs questionÕ, p.372. 
4
 ibid. pp.372-3. 
5
 See Rick Grush, ÔSkill and spatial contentÕ, Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (6) (1998). 
6
 Evans, ÔMolyneuxÕs questionÕ, p.384. 
7
 ibid. p.391.!
! 3!
pulsation, on this view, in virtue of its putting us in a position to Ôexercise a battery of 
skillsÕ in an Ôimmediate and non-inferential mannerÕÑskills such as nodding the head 
or waving a hand along with the pulsation. And this is reflected in how qualities such 
as pulsatingness are represented. It is, Grush says Ôpart of the normal content of 
pulsatingness, for us, that it is something with which we can co-ordinate a number of 
sensory-motor skillsÕ. The same skills will be involved in the representation of 
pulsation in all modalities, and thus, on this view, the perceptual representation of 
pulsatingness will be the same across modalities.  
 
3. Explaining ASYMMETRY 
I will not assess the merits of the skills-based view here. What is important for my 
purposes is that GrushÕs account does not capture the asymmetry apparent in EvansÕ 
responses to MQ and TMQ. As we have seen, Evans answers ÔyesÕ to MQ via V. But 
that he takes this answer to be a great deal less obvious than the ÔyesÕ he gives to 
TMQ is evident from his prolonged discussion of how V might defend his answer to 
MQ. In contrast, no argument is given for thinking that the answer to TMQ is ÔyesÕ. 
Why were EvansÕ responses to the two questions, in this way, asymmetric? The 
significance of this question is not merely exegetical. We share EvansÕ confidence 
that the answer to TMQ will be ÔyesÕ, and we are, at least, less certain of the answer to 
MQ. What is to be explained is why we respond to the two questions in this way, and 
not merely why Evans does. Call this difference in response to the two questions 
ASYMMETRY, for brevity. Our question now is: what explains ASYMMETRY? 
We might expect an appeal to phenomenal character to play some role in 
explaining ASYMMETRY. As Kirk Ludwig remarks, 
 
Éif there is no phenomenal difference between perception of shape in sight 
and touch, then a man blind from birth whose sight is fully restored as an adult 
should, it seems, have no trouble visually distinguishing the globe from the 
cube.
8
  
 
Conversely, if sighted subjects find, on introspecting, a phenomenal difference 
between the perception of shape in sight and touch, this might be an obstacle to their 
accepting that the newly sighted individual will recognise the shapes he sees. The 
confidence of hearing subjects reflecting on TMQ might likewise be explained by a 
phenomenal similarity in the perception of temporal properties in hearing and touch. 
But what phenomenal difference in the spatial case and similarity in the temporal case 
might play this role?  
Plausibly, each modality has Ôspecial sensiblesÕ that go some way to 
explaining the distinctive phenomenology of experience in each. Seeing and feeling 
the shape of a lemon differ, you might think, because in the former and not the latter 
one experiences yellowness with the lemonÕs shape. But experiences of temporal 
properties in different modalities differ in this way too. One is aware of yellowness 
with pulsatingness when one perceives a pulsating yellow light, for example, and not 
when one feels or hears something pulsating. It does not appear likely that we will 
find an appropriate spatial phenomenal difference for which there is no temporal 
analogue amongst the special sensibles. But there are other phenomenal differences 
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between experiences had in different modalities than those that are explicable by 
appeal to special sensibles. 
For example, when I see a lemon, it appears to occupy a location at a distance 
from me, in a region of space of which I am also, in some respect, visually aware. 
When I touch the lemon, I am aware of no such region of space in just this way. The 
lemon appears, tactually, to be right at the boundaries of an object, namely my body. 
The spatial character of perceptual experiences in other modalities is different again.
9
 
It is not immediately obvious why this spatial phenomenal difference would lead one 
to expect the answer to MQ to be ÔnoÕ, for to explain that it is not enough merely to 
identify a phenomenal difference in seeing and feeling. One must pinpoint, more 
precisely, a phenomenal difference in seeing and feeling shape properties. 
Furthermore, for this phenomenal difference to play a role in explaining 
ASYMMETRY we must also identify a relevant phenomenal similarity in perceiving 
temporal properties in different modalities. In ¤4-6 I will consider two accounts of 
what the spatial difference between experiences in different senses amounts to, and 
argue that the second of these two accounts provides the better phenomenological 
explanation of ASYMMETRY. 
There may be other, non-phenomenological ways to explain ASYMMETRY 
that the explanation I will offer will not rule out. My aim is to present some 
considerations about the phenomenal character of experiences in different modalities 
that, if true, would lead one to expect ASYMMETRY. These considerations are of 
independent interest in that they involve features of perceptual experience that are 
interesting, and somewhat overlooked.  
4. The Ôdifferent spaces, one timeÕ explanation 
I noted, above, that visual and tactile perceptual experiences (and experiences in other 
modalities) differ in their spatial phenomenal character. The explanation of 
ASYMMETRY I sketch in this section accounts for this spatial, phenomenal 
difference just in terms of the objects and properties one perceives when having such 
experiences. The proponent of this explanation endorses a view on which the objects 
of each sense are located in sense-specific spaces.  
Berkeley, for instance, and twentieth century sense-data theorists, described 
sense-specific spaces within which the immediate objects of just one sense are 
located. The expression Ôthe visual fieldÕ is sometimes associated with sense-data 
theory: therein, it denotes the sensational space within which all and only visual 
sense-data are located. Whatever tactile sense-data may be, they do not appear to be 
located in that same space. On C. D. BroadÕs view: 
 
The spatial characteristics of the sensa of one sense do not literally extend to 
those of another senseÉ My visual sensa have places in my visual field, and 
my tactual sensa have places in my tactual field; there is no place in which 
both are literally present.
10
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Whilst Broad uses spatial location to illustrate his point (ÔplaceÕ in the visual or 
tactual field) the point itself is more general. The spatial characteristics of the objects 
we most directly perceive, are, on BroadÕs view, sense-specific. Shapes are, of course, 
spatial characteristics. They are ways of extending into or taking up space. Berkeley is 
explicit that shape properties are not common across the senses, and on this he bases 
his ÔnoÕ to MQ.
11
 We should not see this claim about the diversity of spatial properties 
perceived across senses as additional to the claim that the visual and tactual fields are 
distinct. The ÔBerkeley-BroadÕ view is that the visual and tactual fields are distinct 
just in that as far as the most direct objects of perception are concerned, no spatial 
properties are perceived in more than one modality.  
On this view, the spatial phenomenal difference between seeing and feeling 
introduced in ¤3 can be explained by there being no common spatial properties of 
which we are aware in these modalities. And more specifically, on this view, one can 
see why there would be a phenomenal difference between seeing and feeling shape 
properties, specifically: there are no common shape properties of which we are aware 
in seeing and feeling. This difference in what we are aware of, or in what is 
represented across the senses, can then explain our doubting whether the newly-
sighted subject would be able to recognise the shapes of the objects placed before 
him, since it is an account of how there comes to be a phenomenal difference for us 
(assuming we are sighted) to find when we reflect on our experiences of seeing and 
feeling shapes. Furthermore, it seemed to Broad at least, that objects of perception 
were not presented as located in different times in the way in which they are presented 
as located in different spaces. The quotation above continues, helpfully: 
 
Éit does seem to me that temporal relations do literally connect sensa 
belonging to different senses of the same observer. I can often judge quite 
immediately that a certain noise that I sense is contemporary with a certain 
flash that I senseÉ Here I seem to be using the names of these temporal 
relations quite literallyÉ
12
 
 
If Broad is correct then the phenomenal difference between seeing and feeling shapes 
currently under discussion has no temporal analogue. This being the case, we can see 
why we would not have the same scruples about TMQ as we do about MQ. Hence, 
ASYMMETRY. In the next section I introduce some difficulties for this Ôdifferent 
spaces, same timeÕ (or ÔDSSTÕ) explanation of ASYMMETRY.  
 
5. Problems for the DSST explanation 
Explaining ASYMMETRY need not involve answering MQ or TMQ. However, the 
view of perceptual experience that underlies the DSST explanation is often associated 
with answering ÔnoÕ to MQ, which has sometimes been thought a reason to want to 
defend a ÔyesÕ, instead. As Naomi Eilan writes, 
 
Éit is generally supposed that if the answer to the questionÉshould be ÔNotÕ, 
on the grounds that our spatial perceptions are modality-specific, in some 
sense, this poses a serious threat to our access through perception to the world 
out there.
13
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But as Evans points out, it is consistent with BÕs view (B being another imaginary 
philosopher, with a view of perception somewhat like BerkeleyÕs or BroadÕs) that the 
answer to MQ is nevertheless ÔyesÕ because the connection between visible and 
tangible spatial qualities is Ôpre-programmed into the brainÕ.
14
 The Berkeley-Broad 
account of the phenomenal difference between seeing and feeling shape that 
underpins the DSST explanation of ASYMMETRY is consistent with a ÔyesÕ to MQ. 
However, even if it doesnÕt entail ÔnoÕ to MQ, the DSST explanation of 
ASYMMETRY might still be thought to threaten perceptual objectivity.  If the 
objects of sight and of touch are objects only of a single sense, with no shared spatial 
properties, then those objects are not objects in a world Ôout thereÕ to which we think 
that perception gives us access. Just as some have wanted to avoid answering ÔnoÕ to 
MQ for fear of threatening perceptual objectivity, so one might want to avoid having 
to accept the DSST explanation of ASYMMETRY, for the same reason. This is the 
first difficulty with this explanation.  
The second, related, difficulty is that given the presupposition of a view on 
which the immediate objects of perception are other than the objects we generally 
take ourselves to perceive, the DSST explanation faces the challenge of explaining the 
purported transparency of experience. The transparency thesis, as M.G.F. Martin puts 
it, asserts firstly that introspection reveals Ôless than the sense-datum theory predictsÕ, 
in that it does not reveal sense data, and it asserts, secondly, that introspection reveals 
Ôthat there is more to the character of experience than one would anticipate on the 
basis of a pure sense-datumÉviewÕÑone finds, that is, mind-independent, everyday 
objects.
15
 
Thirdly, the DSST explanation of ASYMMETRY might be thought 
inconsistent with the occurrence of experiences with cross-modal spatial content: at 
least, the defender of the DSST explanation owes us an explanation of the apparent 
occurrence of such experiences. Plausibly, we do not merely judge but perceive 
objects that are perceived at the same time in different modalities as standing in 
spatial relations to one another. For instance, at least on the face of it, the lemon I see 
perceptually appears to be above the floor that I cannot see but can only feel with my 
feet beneath the table. More generally, it is plausible to think that one way in which 
experiences in different modalities are ÔunifiedÕ is that they are Ôof a common spatial 
frameworkÕ,
16
 and, arguably, such a framework is required to explain cross-modal 
cuing of spatial selective attention and the occurrence of certain cross-modal illusions. 
This sits ill with the supposition that the objects of each sense are located in distinct 
spaces.  
I do not mean to suggest that the proponent of the DSST explanation cannot 
respond to these difficulties, by, for instance, explaining why we are wrong to think 
that perception gives us unmediated access to mind-independent things. However, in 
the next section I introduce a different explanation of ASYMMETRY that can 
respond to the difficulties without incurring what to many will look to be 
unacceptable costs. This structural explanation and the DSST explanation both begin 
by drawing oneÕs attention to the same spatial phenomenal difference between 
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experiences of shape in different modalities: the difference introduced in ¤3. 
However, they rely on different views of what it is oneÕs attention is thus drawn to. 
 
6. The ÔstructuralÕ explanation 
 
6.1 
At the heart of the structural explanation of ASYMMETRY is a notion of the 
visual field quite different to that endorsed by the proponent of the DSST 
explanation.
17
 To understand this notion, begin by thinking of the boundaries of the 
region of space that we are, in some way, aware of in visual experience.
 
The 
boundaries in question are not best thought of as objects of awareness. They are not 
further things that we see, as we see the edges of objects in the field.
 
And they are not 
the edges of some object or portion of stuff. Instead, they are boundaries delimited by 
our own visual, sensory limitations and we aware of them as such. 
To make this claim clearer, think how peculiar it would be for someone to be 
surprised, on turning their head far to the left, to find that space doesnÕt end behind 
their left shoulder. Before turning their head, they take the region of space of which 
they are aware with their head held still, looking straight ahead, to be all the space 
there is. We are clearly not in this subjectÕs position, and more to the point, their 
visual experience is very unlike our own. Not only do we know that there is more 
space beyond our left shoulders, though we cannot see anything in that space without 
moving, but it seems to us, visually, as if there is more space beyond the boundaries. 
More specifically, it seems as if there is more space in which there may be more to be 
seen. The boundaries of the visual field are fixed by our visual, sensory limitationsÑ
by how far, and in what directions, we can seeÑand that is just how they seem to us. 
The visual field then, in MartinÕs distinctive sense, is the corollary of this awareness 
of boundaries beyond which one cannot see. It is a region of space in which things 
can be seen, and that is just how it seems to us. We are aware, in vision, of a region of 
space, in that we are aware of a region of space as that within which things can be 
seen.  
Tactile perceptual experience is quite different, spatially, from visual 
experience. I have, here, space only to remark positively on the spatial structure of 
visual experience. But (I hope) it suffices to say about tactile experience only that its 
spatial structure is not like this. We are not, in touch, aware of a region of space 
within which we tactually perceive objects in just this way. We are aware of the 
things we perceive, tactually, as in contact with the boundaries of an object, namely, 
oneÕs body. The difference between vision and touch thus described is, we have said, 
a structural one. Why is ÔstructuralÕ apt? For two reasons.  
First, the difference is in how experiences are built or configured, 
independently of what they are experiences of. The features in virtue of which vision 
has a spatial field, and in virtue of which there is not, in this way, a tactile spatial field 
are, as Matthew Soteriou puts it, Ôrelatively invariantÕ.
18
 They stay the same when we 
re-arrange, change or take away the objects (and properties of such objects) of which 
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we are aware. And, across the senses, they can differ when all the objects and their 
properties are the same.  
Second, we can understand these features of experience as a matter not of 
which things we perceive, but of how we perceive those thingsÑthese features 
structure our perceptual experience of the things we are aware of. VisionÕs having its 
spatial field, on this view, is not a matter of our being aware of another object, or 
property of an object, in addition to, say, the lemon and the table and their properties. 
So there is no appropriate additional object or property of an object to attend to, when 
reflecting upon these structural features of perceptual experience. Nevertheless, we 
find these structural features in attending to the worldly objects and properties. This 
reflects the fact that structural features are features of the way we are aware of the 
objects of experience and their properties: in the case of vision, we are aware of the 
lemon and the table as occupying and extending into a region of space within which 
things can be seen. In touch, we are not aware of the lemon, or of anything else, in 
this way.  
The second way in which the spatial phenomenal difference between sight and 
touch can be thought ÔstructuralÕ is that which allows for an explanation of 
ASYMMETRY distinct from the DSST explanation. (Part of) appearing shapedÑ
square, or cubed, sayÑis appearing to extend into or occupy space in a certain (say, 
Ôsquare-ishÕ) way. With the idea of the spatial, structural features of perceptual 
experience in mind we can understand how something can appear to extend into or 
occupy space in that square-ish way differently, in different modalities of experience. 
Visually appearing (or looking) square is appearing to extend into or take up space 
that we are aware of as a space in which things can be seen. The same is not true of 
tactually appearing (or feeling) square. The phenomenology of feeling square is not 
that of appearing to occupy a space in which things can be seen in the square-ish way, 
or in any way at all. This difference in looking and feeling square, or otherwise 
shaped, is, according to the structural explanation, that which explains why we are 
reluctant to think that the answer to MQ is ÔyesÕ. To explain ASYMMETRY one must 
also explain why it seems obvious to us that the answer to TMQ is ÔyesÕ. We will see 
how the structural explanation achieves this second task, next.  
 
6.2 
The (Martinian) visual field is a sub-variety of the more general kind, Ôsensory fieldÕ.  
Another sub-variety of sensory field is the temporal field.
19
 There is a temporal field 
in that 
 
Éthe things we perceive are perceived as filling, occupying, or having some 
location within, an interval of time, just as the objects we see are generally 
seen as filling, occupying, or having a location within a region of space.
20
  
 
A defence of this claim instructs one to reflect upon differences in the phenomenal 
character of perceiving changes of different kinds (specifically, changes that occur at 
different speeds). Consider, then, the difference in oneÕs perception of the movement 
of the second hand of an analogue clock, and oneÕs awareness (such as it is) of the 
movement of the hour hand. In the former case, one sees the second hand moving. It 
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doesnÕt seem right to say, though, that one sees the hour hand moving. It moves too 
slowly for that. 
The imperceptibility of slow change, as of the location of the hour hand, can 
be explained Ôin terms of the idea of an upper temporal limit, a maximum duration 
that acts of temporal experience can span.Õ
21
 This duration is clearly shorter than the 
Ôminimum period that it takes for the hour hand to travel between two positions that 
you can visually discriminate.Õ
22
 ThatÕs why we cannot see the hour hand moving. 
This limited interval within which things can be perceived to be happening is the 
temporal sensory field. Whilst the comparison between slow and fast(er) change helps 
to make the existence of such an interval especially apparent, that there is such an 
interval might also be thought of as responsible for there being a limit to how much of 
an occurrence one can take in Ôall togetherÕ: a few seconds of a film, but not the 
whole thing, for instance.
23
 
There are ways in which the temporal sensory field is like the visual, spatial, 
sensory field (or visual field, for short): both involve there seeming, in some respect, 
to be limits in experience.
24
 In the case of the visual field, these are boundaries 
beyond which one cannot see. In the case of the temporal field, these are the 
boundaries of an interval within which things can seem to occur, obtain or persist. 
Second, there being, in experience, a limited region of space or interval of time is to 
be understood in terms of structural features of experience. The visual field, as it 
features in the structural explanation, is not a distinct space, occupied only by that 
which is visually perceptible. It is not itself a distinct object of vision and neither does 
it imply the existence of any objects or spatial properties of objects accessible only 
visually. Likewise, there is not an additional object of awareness (an interval or 
stretch of time) that we perceive as we perceive the things that occur, obtain or persist 
during that interval. That there is a temporal field, understood in the relevant way, is 
discovered by attending to those occurring, obtaining and persisting things, and the 
temporal structural features of experience are to be understood as the form or 
structure of our awareness of them.  
However, the visual field is specific to vision. Experience in other modalities 
has different spatial, structural, features. Touch, as we have said, does not have 
visionÕs field-like structure.  The temporal field, in contrast, is amodal. For every 
sense, there is in experience a limited interval in just the same way as there is for 
vision. For every sense, one can identify examples of distinctions between slow and 
fast change, and between that which one can and cannot experience Ôat onceÕ, to make 
this apparent: I leave it to the readerÕs imagination to supply these examples. There is 
no difference, across modalities, in what is thus made apparent. Thus, the temporal 
structure of perceptual experience is amodal.
25
  
According to the structural explanation of ASYMMETRY, when one reflects 
on what it is like to perceive pulsation (or continuousness) in sight and touch (or in 
another modality capable of representing this property) one does not find a 
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phenomenal difference in how those properties are experienced that corresponds to 
the difference we do find in how spatial properties are experienced, and which was 
introduced above, in ¤6.1.  
 
6.3 
The structural explanation, like the DSST explanation, explains our tendency to doubt 
that the answer to MQ can be ÔyesÕ in terms of a phenomenal difference between 
seeing and feeling shapes. The structural explanation and the DSST explanation rely 
on competing accounts of this difference. The former accounts for the difference not 
in terms of different objects and properties apparently perceived but in terms of a 
different way of experiencing the same objects and properties. For this reason, the 
structural explanation avoids the three difficulties to which the DSST explanation is 
subject.  
First, the structural explanation is consistent with a plausible version of the 
transparency thesis. The explanation enthusiastically agrees that when we turn 
attention from the mind-independent objects of perception, to the experience we have 
of those objects, the objects remain the focus of attention.
26
 But in thus attending, 
according to the structural explanation, we find those phenomenological differences 
that can, we have argued, be understood as a matter of the form or structure of the 
experience. Unlike the DSST explanation, the spatial phenomenological difference 
between sight and touch is not explained in terms of` awareness of or attention to any 
objects other than the mind-independent ones we take ourselves to perceive.  
The structural explanation is also, for similar reasons, consistent with the idea 
that perceptual experiences across the modalities share a common spatial framework. 
Because it does not appeal to distinct, modality-specific spaces but only differences in 
the spatial structure of experience of objects, it can allow that those objects occupy a 
single, worldly, space. It is also no part of the explanation that differences in 
structural features need make cross-modal spatial relations opaque to the sighted, 
feeling subject. It is consistent with this explanation that such a subject can tell that 
object O
1
 perceived in modality M
1
 is to the left of O
2
 perceived in M
2
, for example. 
The structural explanation does not take experiencing an object and its properties in 
different modalities to be closely assimilated to thinking about the same thing under 
different modes of presentation. When one thinks in this way, sameness of reference 
is obscured: the possibility of such obscuring is plausibly constitutive of difference in 
(Fregean) sense. But it is consistent with the structural explanation that the 
phenomenal differences between seeing and feeling the objects and properties in a 
scene leave relations between those objects and properties, perceived in different 
modalities, apparent to the perceiver.  
DoesnÕt this undermine the structural explanation? One might worry that it 
does, since it suggests that the explanation is consistent with our also being able to 
tell, perceptually, that O
1 
perceived in M
1
 is the same shape as O
2 
perceived in M
2
. In 
fact, the defender of the structural explanation need not deny that the sighted, feeling 
subject can recognise shapes cross-modally. She does not, after all, set out to argue 
that the answer to MQ is ÔnoÕ but only to explain why the sighted subject, on 
introspecting, might doubt that the answer is ÔyesÕ. According to the structural 
explanation, on introspecting oneÕs experiences of the shapes of O
1 
and O
2
, one will 
find a phenomenal difference between them which is to be understood as a structural 
difference, though it is not, as the availability of the DSST explanation makes clear, 
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obvious to introspection that it is a structural difference. Our noticing this phenomenal 
difference explains why we are uncertain about whether the newly-sighted subject 
will be able to recognise shapes perceived with their newly-acquired modality. Since 
the difference is a structural difference, it may turn out be that this uncertainty is 
misplaced: maybe the newly-sighted subjects will be able to Ôsee throughÕ structural 
differences to the common properties represented by sight and touch. But since the 
proponent of the structural explanation is not, as such, interested in the answer to MQ, 
this is no concern of hers.  
For the same reasons that the structural explanation doesnÕt conflict with the 
transparency thesis, nor with the perception of cross-modal spatial relations, it is, also, 
consistent with the ÔobjectivityÕ of perceptual experience. One difficulty with the 
DSST explanation was that ifÑas the DSST explanation presupposesÑthe objects 
which we most directly perceive by sight and touch do not share any spatial 
properties, then those objects are not the objects in a world Ôout thereÕ to which we 
think that perception gives us access. But the structural explanation makes no such 
presupposition. It is consistent with the structural explanation that (at least, some of) 
the same objects and properties are perceived by sight and touch, though we perceive 
those objects and properties in different ways, in that our visual and tactile 
experiences have different spatial, structural features.   
This is a particularly interesting consequence of the structural explanation. As we 
said in ¤5, whilst it is mistaken to think that ÔyesÕ to MQ is inconsistent with a view 
on which perceptual experience fails to be of mind-independent objects, nevertheless, 
Ôresistance to answering affirmativelyÕ, in the case of MQ is often thought to be 
Ôanimated byÕ a conception of perceptual experience and the distinction between the 
senses on which there is a clear connection between modality-specificity and a lack of 
objectivity.
27
 OÕCallaghan, for instance, elides the claims that Ôawareness of space 
consists in awareness involving features unique to a given sense modalityÕ and (from 
Russell) that the space Ôof scienceÕ (i.e., objective space) is neither Ôthe space of touch 
or the space of sight.Õ OÕCallaghan appears to believe then, that objective spatial 
awareness cannot be explained in terms of modality-specific features.  
Similar concerns are raised elsewhere. In his first paper on MolyneuxÕs 
Question,
28
 John Campbell defends an ÔexternalistÕ conception of shape perception, 
which we can understand as the view that what makes a perceptual experience one of 
shape Ôis the fact that it is responding to shape properties of objects in the 
environmentÕ.
29
 And, he suggests, Ôinsofar as we are externalist about shape 
perception, we will have to think of it as amodalÕ since it will, on such a view, be a 
Ôsingle phenomenonÕ.
30
  If we take this to mean that the perception of an objective 
shape property cannot crucially involve modality-specific features then we must 
disagree with Campbell. On the structural explanation, modality-specific spatial, 
structural features of experience are involved in shape perception but do not stand in 
the way of its objectivity.  
 
7. Perspective, modality specificity and objectivity 
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I start this final section by considering a third explanation of ASYMMETRY: Ruth 
MillikanÕs. MillikanÕs explanation is not, or so I argue, a viable alternative to the 
structural explanation. However, it provides a helpful starting point for further 
discussion of the relationship between the modality specific, spatial, structural 
features of perceptual experience that figure in the structural explanation of 
ASYMMETRY, and the objectivity of perceptual experience.  
 
7.1 
Millikan argued that EvansÕ response to TMQ is based on a pair of common 
mistakes. The Ôassumption behind EvansÕ confidenceÕ about the answer to TMQ is, 
on her view, that Ôcontinuousness and pulsatingness in whatever medium must be 
represented by continuousness and pulsatingness, hence will always be recognised 
againÕ.
31
 Thus, on her view, Evans succumbs to the mistakes she calls Ôcontent 
internalizingÕ and Ôcontent externalizingÕ. One makes the former mistake, in the case 
of perception, if one thinks that properties represented when one perceives belong 
also to the vehicle that carries the content in which those properties are represented. 
Content externalizing is the reciprocal move: thinking of properties of the vehicle as 
Ôshowing upÕ, also, in the content the vehicle carries. The Millikanian explanationÑ
and diagnosisÑof ASYMMETRY is that whilst we have come to recognize the 
falsity of such moves for experience of colours and shapes, it is less clear that we 
have, as she puts it, Ôassimilated the truthÕ in the case of temporal experience.
32
  
The first problem for MillikanÕs explanation is that it depends on its being 
phenomenologically plausible (if, as she thinks, ultimately mistaken) to think of 
experiences of pulsating things as themselves pulsating, and experiences of 
continuous things as themselves continuous. But this is not intuitive. Continuous 
experiences of pulsating things, and pulsating experiences of continuous things, are 
easy to imagine and occur fairly frequently.  
The second and more interesting problem relates to the status of MillikanÕs 
explanation as diagnosis. It is important for Millikan not only that we think that the 
answer to TMQ is ÔyesÕ due to making the internalizing and externalizing moves she 
identifies, but also that these moves are mistaken for all kinds of properties. It seems 
right to say that they are mistaken for spatial properties. However, whilst they 
probably are mistaken for the temporal qualities mentioned in TMQ (pulsatingness 
and continuousness) there is another temporal quality for which content internalizing 
and externalizing moves are, arguably, valid. The temporal quality in question is 
temporal location: the place in time at which something seems to occur or obtain. It is 
temptingÑand I will suppose, trueÑto say that there does not seem to be any 
distinction, in experience, between the apparent temporal location of the objects of 
experience (when they are present or occur) and the temporal location of the 
experience itself. 
33
 So MillikanÕs explanation of ASYMMETRY fails as diagnosis, 
because to the extent that we may be reluctant to abandon content internalizing and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31
 Ruth Millikan, R. ÔPerceptual content and Fregean mythÕ Mind 100 (399) (1991) pp.439-59, at 
p.443. There is some exegetical support for MillikanÕs diagnosis; see Evans, ÔMolyneuxÕs questionÕ, 
p.373 n.18.  
32
 ibid. 
33
 For defence of this claim see Ian Phillips, ÔThe temporal structure of experienceÕ in D. Lloyd and V. 
Arstila (Eds.), Subjective Time: the Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality. 
(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2014), pp.139-158 and Oliver Rashbrook, ÔAn appearance of succession 
requires a succession of appearancesÕ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3) (2013) 
pp.584-610.  
! 13!
externalizing in the case of temporal propertiesÑi.e., where temporal location is 
concernedÑwe may well be right to do so.  
Now, as far as a defence of the structural explanation is concerned this last 
point may seem otiose. MillikanÕs explanation is no serious competitor to the 
structural explanation just because, as we have already seen, it is not intuitive that 
experiences of pulsation pulsate, and experiences of continuousness are continuous. 
But it is worth homing in on the failure of MillikanÕs explanation as diagnosis, in any 
case. Why? As we saw in the previous section, the structural explanation allows us to 
accommodate the idea of perceptual experienceÕs having modality-specific features, 
without threatening the objectivity of such experience. Exploring why we are tempted 
(and right to be tempted) by content internalizing and externalizing moves in the case 
of the perception of temporal location, if in no other case, helps to reiterate the point 
that modality specificity does not, in itself, imply a lack of objectivity, and also to 
argue that modality specific features may have a positive role to play in at least one 
kind of perceptual objectivity. In fact, we should not rule out, yet, that the spatial 
structural features that figure in the structural explanation of ASYMMETRY have just 
this role. 
 
7.2 
Our reluctance to abandon content internalizing and externalizing moves just for the 
case of temporal location is explained by the following phenomenological 
observation: 
 
 (D) There is not an introspectively accessible distinction between the 
temporal location of an experience, and the temporal location of the apparent 
object of that experience. An analogous claim about spatial location does not 
seem to be true.  
 
Note that what D says about the spatial character of experience is wholly negative: 
there is not a certain lack of an introspectively accessible distinction, namely, between 
the spatial location of experience and of its (apparent) objects. There is reason to 
emphasise this wholly negative claim. Even the question of the relationship between 
the temporal properties of experience and of its objects arises in the case of temporal 
properties, specifically, because, as Ian Phillips has written, Ôtime is specialÕ:
34
 
experience has temporal properties that one can attend to, even if indirectly, by 
attending to the objects of experience. Thus one can so much as ask about their 
relationship to the temporal properties of other things, such as the objects of 
experience. It is not clear we can make any sense of the idea of experience having 
introspectively accessible, spatial properties of its own, such that we can so much as 
ask about their relationship to the apparent spatial properties of the objects of 
experience. Hence, there is a wholly negative claim to be made here: we do not find a 
certain distinction in the case of our experience of temporal location, and we cannot 
say the same about our experience of spatial location.  
However, what D says about the spatial character of experience can be spelled 
out more positively, too. Which is to say, there is a positive, introspectively accessible 
distinction to be made between the spatial properties of the apparent objects of 
perception and something else. The relevant distinction is between the spatial location 
of the apparent objects of perception and the spatial location from which one seems to 
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perceive those objects. Turning to this distinction is not changing the subject away 
from D. The temporal location from which one apparently perceives things is most 
naturally thought of as the temporal location of the experience one has. What else 
could it be? So, we can understand the following, D2, as equivalent to D: 
 
(D2) There is an introspectively accessible distinction between the spatial 
place from which one perceives things, and the apparent spatial location of 
those perceived things. There is no such distinction, on the other hand, 
between the temporal location from which one perceives things, and the 
apparent temporal location of those perceived things. 
 
And D2 can, in turn, be expressed much more neatly as follows: 
 
(D3) Perceptual experience has a spatial perspectival character, but does not 
have a temporal perspectival character.
35
 
 
D3, a spelling out of D, is then a way of capturing why we are tempted (and right to 
be tempted) by content internalizing and externalizing moves in the case of the 
perception of temporal location, if in no other case. And the reason why we are not 
tempted to make the moves for the case of spatial location is, arguably, an aspect of 
the phenomenal character of perceptual experience that is responsible for one kind of 
perceptual objectivity, namely, the phenomenal objectivity of perceptual experience. 
An experience is phenomenally objective if it seems to be an experience of objects 
that are not dependent for their existence on the perceiverÕs mind. As A.D. Smith 
points out, one way in which experience can achieve this kind of objectivity is by 
presenting to us the spatial relationship between objects of awareness and ourselves. 
As Smith puts it:  
 
Perception concerns the Òexternal world.Ó The suggestion is that this is, in 
essential part, because perceptual experience presents such ÒexternalÓ objects 
as literally externalÑto our bodies.
36
 
 
Suppose this is right.
37
 Note, now, that like the spatial structure of experience, the 
spatial perspectival character of experience is modality-specific: it differs across the 
senses. Arguably, it differs in that there are different locations from which one seems 
to perceive in different modalities. I seem to see from the location of my eyes, and 
hear from the location of my ears, and so on. It also differs in other ways. The lemon 
seems to be at a location distinct from the place from which I see it in that there seems 
to be quite a distance between the two: a large spatial separation. The lemon-odour 
seems to be at a location distinct from the place from which I smell it in that it seems 
to be in the vicinity of my nose, but is otherwise (usually) indeterminately located.
38
 
The lemon seems to be at a location distinct from the finger with which I feel it in that 
it seems to be just beyond the boundaries of that finger, and in contact with it. Of 
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course, there are no corresponding differences in the temporal perspectival character 
of perceptual experience since it has no temporal perspectival character.  
If Smith is right that one way for experiences to be phenomenally objective is 
for them to be spatially perspectival, and yet the spatial perspectival character of 
experience differs across the senses, then some modality specific spatial features of 
experience do not preclude, but are responsible for its objectivity (of one kind, 
anyway). And these will be whatever modality specific features are involved in 
perceptual experience, in each modality, having the spatial perspectival character that 
it does. The significance of this for our purposes is three-fold. First, it is a further 
illustration of the point, made above, that there is no clear connection between 
modality-specificity and a lack of objectivity. Second, it shows, further, that some 
modality specific features may have a positive role to play in perceptual experienceÕs 
achieving at least one kind of objectivity. Third, we should not rule out that the 
modality specific features involved in experience, in each modality, having the spatial 
perspectival character that it does just are the spatial structural features that figure in 
the structural explanation of ASYMMETRY. 
We should not rule this out because it is plausible that differences in 
perspectival character, across modalities, are to be explained in terms of something 
other than just which objects and properties are perceived. I can have a tactile and a 
visual experience of the same lemon at the same location in space that have different 
perspectival characters. Structural features, which are a matter not of what is 
perceived but how, seem like good candidates to explain this difference. Furthermore, 
descriptions of modality-specific perspectival character overlap in obvious ways with 
descriptions of modality-specific structure. For example, as we saw in ¤6.1, the 
spatial structural features of visual experience are such that we are aware not just of 
objects and their properties, but also a region of space in which they are located. The 
perspectival character of visual experience involves seeming spatial separation 
between oneÕs eyes and the objects one sees, which is to say, awareness of the space 
between the two. It ought to be explored whether this awareness of space, too, can be 
explained in terms of the spatial structural features of visual experience. Are we 
aware of the space between our eyes and the things we see as (part of) the space 
within which things can be seen? This and related questions deserve further attention 
which can and will have to wait for another occasion.  
We have seen that whatever the answer to MolyneuxÕs Question might be, 
there has been resistance to answering ÔnoÕ due to an association between views of 
perception in which it is in some respect modality specific, and views on which our 
Ôaccess through perception to the world out thereÕ is threatened. I have argued that the 
modality specific, spatial, structural features of experience that explain hesitance 
about answering ÔyesÕ to MQ are not, in this way, threatening. In fact, there are 
reasons, deserving of further exploration, to think that these modality-specific features 
might have a positive role to play in the objectivity (of one kind, anyway) of 
perceptual experience. 
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